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I
am pleased to be here today to talk about a subject that is of great
interest to me, as I am involved in both financial supervision and
monetary policy. This subject—how our supervisory framework can
contribute to a stable financial system that fully supports sustainable
economic growth—is important for several reasons.
In recent years, in developing as well as developed countries,
financial crises have occurred all too often and have imposed great costs
to the countries they have affected. In fact, in recent decades very few
countries have escaped some form of financial distress or crisis. A 1996
survey by the IMF, for instance, found that 73 percent of their member
countries had experienced significant banking problems during the
preceding 15 years. Many of these problems led to substantial declines
in GDP, serious disruptions in credit and capital markets, and adversity
for the banking industry and its customer base. This historical record
provides a clear picture of the importance of the supervisory issues we
are discussing today—and of the need for careful thought regarding any
effort to assure financial stability.
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These recent financial crises have also coincided with and been
influenced by a period of rapid and pathbreaking changes in our
financial markets. While banks are still a critical part of the financial
picture, they are now just one highlight on the financial landscape.
Sharing the spotlight are an ever-expanding set of capital markets and
the financial instruments and firms associated with them. In the United
States at least, these developments are reintegrating banking and capital
markets to a degree we have not seen since the Great Depression. These
changes in our financial structure are, in turn, altering the nature of the
financial crises we experience. Increasingly, crises originate in capital
markets and are characterized by asset-price volatility and disruptions in
market liquidity.
Because these developments and their effects on the supervisory
framework are far from over, I would like to begin with a review of the
major changes evident in the financial sector. Then I will review some
of the supervisory steps already taken to address recent crises within the
changing financial system. And finally, I will look at what the
appropriate role might be for macro-prudential supervision and what
could reasonably be accomplished under this framework, including
shifting more attention to capital markets and the need to prevent
costly financial crises there.
I should mention again, though, that as I am involved both with
financial supervision and monetary policy, I have a natural tendency to
think of supervisory issues in terms of our ultimate policy objectives of
financial stability, sustainable economic growth, and customer
protection, rather than in terms of micro- versus macro-prudential
supervision. Thinking of it this way, I will explain why, despite all the
changes we have observed in financial markets, the problems
policymakers face today are the same ones we have always faced. They
are perhaps more challenging today, however, because our financial
system is so much more complex than it used to be.
I. THE CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Any assessment of today’s financial system—both domestically and
worldwide—must recognize that, in its detail, the system is much
different than it was a few decades ago. Technology lies at the heart ofECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 7
much of this change. Technology has greatly reduced the cost of
gathering, processing, and transmitting information, and thus has
allowed a wide range of new financial instruments, rapidly growing
competition across industry segments, and new methods of conducting
financial business and managing risk. In some ways, this change is
revolutionary, a development of the information age. In other respects,
however, it is just another stage in an evolution that has long been
under way, driven in earlier periods by such developments as the
telegraph, the telephone, and improved methods of transportation.
From this longer-term perspective, what is most novel about this stage
of technological change is not that changes are taking place, but that
they are occurring at an ever-increasing pace.
From any perspective, the decline in transaction and information
costs made possible by technology is allowing capital markets to operate
more efficiently and to assume a much broader role in the economy.
One notable outgrowth of this development is the disappearance of
previously segmented financial systems. Today we see the emergence of
a framework in which a wide variety of institutions and markets now
compete directly for the same business. With this cross-industry
competition and the rising importance of capital markets, we can no
longer view prudential supervision and systemic risk as banking
industry issues alone.
Another significant change is the variety of financial products and
services available. Innovative financial instruments, electronic banking
services, securitization, and the rapid growth of the derivatives market
are now giving financial customers broader choices and allowing risks to
be partitioned and distributed to those most willing to assume them. As
a result, financial institutions and investors now have a multitude of
options for controlling and diversifying their risk exposure.
Emerging along with these developments have been the
institutional consolidation and globalization of financial markets. This
trend is spawning increasingly large and more complex organizations
with activities spread across many countries. This development, in turn,
is increasing the interdependencies among major organizations and
creating additional systemic linkages. 8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In considering these developments, I want to emphasize two very
striking but divergent patterns. First, of course, major financial
institutions and other market participants have a wider range of
opportunities to diversify risk through financial engineering and a
broader range of activities. But at the same time, the complex web of
connections across institutions, markets, and countries is likely leading
to new sources of systemic risk and financial instability. We must be
prepared to deal with the effects of these risks. These patterns are not
unique to this recent period of financial market innovation. Rather,
they have always characterized change in financial markets.
Clearly, it can be useful to look to the past to inform ourselves
regarding how to better approach the future. But I would stress that we
need to be careful not to presume too much or to rely on past
experience in an indiscriminate way. It is always tempting to assume
that if we can learn how to prevent the crises of the past, we might be
able to anticipate future crises. I will argue, instead, that future crises
will always differ somewhat from past crises. This is particularly so
because supervision and the role of the market continue to change—in
part to prevent a replay of the crises of the past. Consequently, a strict
reliance on past experiences and historical models is likely to provide
limited help in anticipating the answers we need in this changing
financial landscape. 
II. A CHANGING SUPERVISORY SYSTEM
These many and varied developments in the financial system are
influencing how we think about supervising institutions to accomplish
our public policy objectives. Our objectives remain the same as
always—preventing a systemic crisis, protecting financial customers,
and promoting a competitive and efficient financial system that
supports economic growth. But the steps we use to accomplish these
objectives are undergoing significant change. And in pursuing these
objectives, we find ourselves, as always, having to consider an even
broader range of institutions, activities, and markets. 
To illustrate how our supervisory framework is changing, let me
remind you of one of the greatest financial crises in modern history—
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and financial markets, and many banks failed in a period of contagion.
Quite naturally, a restrictive regulatory and supervisory system was put in
place that focused on preventing individual banks from failing, protecting
small depositors, and increasing the integrity of financial markets.
The financial revolution of the last few decades, however, has made
significant parts of this regulatory framework no longer workable.
Rising competition across different segments of the financial industry—
both in the United States and worldwide—has forced us to remove
many regulatory barriers. Bank interest rate ceilings, limits on
geographic expansion, and activity constraints, which once served to
protect particular segments of the industry, are rapidly becoming things
of the past. Also, recent financial crises have revealed moral-hazard
problems and loss exposures under public safety nets. These risks have
forced many countries to take a closer look at the explicit and implicit
guarantees they provide and, in some cases, to reduce or rechannel
such support.
As an outgrowth of these changes, the marketplace is also playing a
greater role in determining how financial resources will be used and
which institutions and products will survive and prosper in a more
competitive environment. In turn, the rising complexity of financial
instruments and institutions is changing the supervisory system. Large
institutions are not only conducting a much wider range of activities
than before, but they can now more readily shift their risk profiles.
These changes, consequently, have led to greater supervisory focus on
an institution’s risk management practices and internal controls—that
is, to a greater focus on an institution’s ability to measure, manage, and
control its risk exposures. Associated with this shift in focus, banking
supervisors have placed less emphasis on a bank’s balance sheet
condition at a single point in time. Also, through “continuous
supervision,” as well as “risk matrix” profiles and other tools, supervisors
are directing closer attention to the largest organizations, especially
those that could pose systemic concerns. 
Other significant changes encompass supervisory efforts to control
interbank exposures, as well as exposures among banks and other
financial institutions and markets. With major institutions
consolidating and becoming even larger, more supervisory attention is
necessarily being devoted to relationships across institutions and to the10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
systemic risks these linkages could pose. Some steps supervisors and
institutions have taken include limits on interbank deposits, Fed
daylight overdraft fees and caps, and various clearinghouse standards,
such as collateral requirements, loss-sharing agreements, and exposure
limits. Marketplace standards and practices are further developing to
control counterparty risk in the derivatives market and across many
trading, clearing, and settlement activities.
Within the capital markets, a number of regulatory changes have
occurred in response to market disruptions, investor demands, and
other events. The 1987 stock market crash in the United States, for
example, brought forth a variety of changes to help ensure that trading
would henceforth occur in a controlled and orderly fashion. Several
commercial paper defaults in 1989 and 1990 prompted the SEC to
tighten the restrictions on the quality, maturity, and concentrations of
commercial paper and securities that money market mutual funds
could hold. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and other recent
accounting scandals in the United States, several steps have been taken
to provide for better corporate governance, more accurate public
disclosures, and stronger oversight of public accounting firms. These
include passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the institution
of stricter stock exchange standards for listed firms.
This is only a brief summary of the changes we are seeing in
financial supervision in response to the revolution in financial services
and the recent financial crises that have plagued many countries. We
are, by no means, through with the process of financial reform, which
brings us to the issue of how macro-prudential supervision best fits in
our supervisory framework.
III. THE ROLE FOR MACRO-PRUDENTIAL 
SUPERVISION
In the context of the aforementioned framework, I want to focus
the rest of my remarks on the appropriate role for macro-prudential
supervision in today’s financial environment. In my dual role as a
financial supervisor and a monetary policymaker, I am constantly
reminded of the importance of having a macro-prudential supervisory
focus. As a supervisor, I have had to deal with the banking and creditECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 11
problems that arose from the energy, real estate, and agricultural
collapses in the United States during the 1980s. And, as a monetary
policymaker, I am constantly exposed to many credit and capital market
issues regarding the possible buildup of debt and investment
imbalances. Addressing these types of financial stress is a key challenge
for macro-prudential supervision.
Based on my experiences, I doubt we will ever predict financial
crises very well. We have never predicted them well in the past. If we
could have foreseen them then, we would have taken steps to prevent
them, or at least greatly minimize their consequences. At our Jackson
Hole Symposium last year, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
stated that “Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the
monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic.” The same
comment could be made about financial markets and supervisory policy.
There are many examples of this: the Asian financial crisis, the
Latin American currency crises, the Scandinavian real estate collapse,
the U.S. stock market crash of 1987, and the 1998 Russian debt crisis
and resulting problems with LTCM. In each case, to varying degrees we
were aware of potential problems and exposures, but problems failed to
arise as expected—until one day they did arise. Often, an economic
downturn, high interest rates, or exchange rate movements stressed
markets and institutions that once appeared sound to the point of crisis
or failure. Ex post the source of each crisis became obvious. Still, we
were caught by surprise. Conversely, many problems predicted by
financial analysts, investors, and supervisors have never materialized.
That is why we inevitably come back to such basic supervisory and
financial concepts as capital adequacy, risk diversification, and limits on
interbank and market exposures.
With this said, let me now address three questions that I believe we
should be asking ourselves when thinking about a macro-prudential
supervisory framework. First, are market discipline and self-regulation
sufficient to prevent systemic crises? Second, how can supervisory policy
better address systemic crises and macroeconomic disturbances? And
third, can monetary policy supplement macro-prudential supervision?
My comments further reflect the importance I place on having a central
bank active in both monetary and supervisory matters.12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Are market discipline and self-regulation sufficient to
prevent systemic crises? 
A factor that is becoming more prominent in a macro-prudential
supervisory framework is market discipline and the role that it could
play in making financial market participants more resilient to shocks.
With the removal of many regulatory barriers, the market now has
greater influence in determining the operating parameters for financial
institutions and markets. In fact, many recent financial market
developments have occurred precisely out of a desire by market
participants to better share and control risks. Examples include the
growth of the derivatives market, increased equity support in U.S. real
estate markets, and ongoing investor efforts to penalize financial firms
with poor risk management practices and inadequate capital. 
For market discipline to work effectively and efficiently, a necessary
ingredient is timely, appropriate, and accurate information. Both
investors and policymakers can play an important role in demanding
and helping to establish information disclosure standards for financial
institutions and other market participants. I have also advocated that
financial supervisors play an active role in helping to ensure financial
institutions adequately disclose significant information to the market,
including significant supervisory findings.
Our recent past further indicates that the marketplace can impose
the most effective and strongest form of discipline on financial
institutions. This discipline should help reinforce macro-prudential
supervision and, when markets are properly structured, contribute to
the strength of the overall economy. However, I believe that financial
externalities will prevent markets from providing all the discipline
needed to reduce the risk of contagion to desirable levels. The
complexity of linkages among market participants is making it difficult
for the market to assess true risk exposures, and in spite of recent
improvements in public disclosures, market participants are unlikely to
have the full set of data necessary for such assessments. In addition,
institutions and investors generally will have no reason to internalize the
effects that they might have on others during a crisis. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 13
How can supervisory policy better address systemic crises and
macroeconomic disturbances? 
From a supervisory standpoint, many of the steps we have taken
during the last few decades and will be taking in the near term are
closely aligned with macro-prudential supervision. This macro-
prudential focus is being driven by the changing financial system. With
larger institutions, greater competition across market segments, and the
growing importance of capital markets, supervisors will have to pay
increasing attention to the interrelationships among institutions and
markets and to the risk that the largest institutions pose to the overall
system. In terms of macro-prudential supervision, there are three basic
concerns for supervisors. They are to promote good risk management
practices at large institutions that might pose a systemic risk, to limit
exposures between institutions and the markets they serve, and to
ensure that supervisory policies do not have adverse or ill-timed effects
over the economic cycle. 
Risk-focused supervision is becoming a cornerstone in supervisory
efforts to address risk management practices at large and small
institutions. Under risk-focused supervision, supervisors channel the
vast majority of their attention to the areas and activities that create the
greatest risk exposure to an individual institution. For larger
institutions, this implies an awareness of risk exposures that pose a
potential threat to other firms and to the general economy, including
any significant risk concentrations in individual markets. While risk
diversification is nothing new, we should remind ourselves that it is a
critical point of emphasis, helping to ensure that institutions are stable
across the economic cycle. U.S. banks, in fact, have performed
remarkably well in a trying environment during the last few years, and
a prime factor behind this performance is improved risk diversification
and management. 
Risk management is just as important for investment banking firms
and other market participants. While securities firms and some other
capital market participants may focus more on trading activities and less
on maintaining a portfolio of assets, it is still essential that these
institutions diversify their counterparty risk and thoroughly check the
reputation of potential trading parties. Likewise, merchant banks and14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
others with a portfolio of investments are wise to diversify their
investment risk. So, whether you view risk-focused supervision as
micro- or macro-prudential, this form of supervision, along with the
related efforts of banks and other market participants, will help make
the financial system less vulnerable to economic disturbances. 
In addition to continuing to rely on risk-focused supervision for
individual institutions, we must continue to work to limit interbank
exposures and improve the overall resiliency of our financial system. In
the United States, for example, major institutions and bank and
securities supervisors are taking steps in the post-9/11 environment to
ensure that core clearing and settlement systems and other critical
financial market roles can be resumed in the event of disasters or key
systems failures. 
A final element in macro-prudential supervision is that our
supervisory policies and rules have consistent and appropriate effects
over the business cycle, including our accounting rules, capital
standards, provisioning requirements, risk-management practices, and
supervisory attitudes and approaches. Capital and provisioning
standards, for example, should reflect a longer-term picture of risk
rather than just the most recent experience or a very optimistic or
pessimistic view of near-term events. While some have suggested that
supervisory policy could be used more on a countercyclical basis to deal
with credit and other market imbalances, I believe our inability to
accurately foresee the future and our need to maintain consistency
throughout the entire supervisory process will leave supervisors playing
a neutral role, at best, over the cycle. 
Can monetary policy supplement macro-prudential supervision? 
From a central bank and monetary policy standpoint, I believe the
most important thing policymakers can do is pursue a stable, low-
inflation environment. Unexpected inflation or deflation clearly
disrupts the agreements inherent in longer-term debt contracts and the
investment objectives and plans of individuals and businesses. If
extreme enough, it can spark a financial crisis. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2004 15
Some, including many at the BIS, have argued that financial crises
often stem from financial imbalances that build up in the economy, and
that there is a role for monetary policy to act preemptively to prevent or
contain such imbalances. I would like to comment on that position. 
First, as I have suggested, financial crises are by their nature difficult
if not impossible to anticipate with any real degree of certainty. In
hindsight, each crisis involves analysis and an understanding of its
causes, as well as changes and corrective steps that supervisors and
market participants pursue to prevent its recurrence. This means that a
similar crisis is unlikely to reoccur anytime soon. However, as the
financial system evolves, new vulnerabilities are uncovered for which we
are not prepared. If history is any guide, there are scant reasons to
believe that we will be much better prepared at spotting these emerging
vulnerabilities than we have been in the past. Not that we should not
try, of course. But if we grow too secure in the belief that we can foresee
and prevent crises before they occur, we risk becoming complacent
precisely when we should be more vigilant. For these reasons, early
warning models of financial crises based on historical data are unlikely
to extrapolate well to future periods, particularly with the rapid changes
we are seeing in credit markets. Indeed, the past few decades have been
a unique experience with substantial deregulation in many countries
and a relaxation of previous constraints on foreign capital flows,
combined with slow progress in building a new supervisory framework.
It is thus not surprising that financial imbalances and crises developed
during this time. But going forward, in the face of further dramatic
changes in the financial sector, they may be even harder to identify and
address in a timely fashion. 
Second, even if we have a sense that financial imbalances may be
emerging, preemptive monetary policy is a very broad tool to be
applying effectively to the imbalance. Most perceived financial
imbalances occur in a particular financial market or segment of a
market. For example, when housing price bubbles have occurred in the
United States, they have appeared only in a few select cities. I am
unaware of there having been a bubble in the national housing market.
And even in the late 1990s, the “bubble” in equity markets was
concentrated in the high-tech sector. The rest of the stock market did
not appear to be overvalued. Raising interest rates to reduce liquidity is16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
an extreme response to the possibility of an imbalance in a single
segment of our financial system. It would risk slowing the economy
when attempting to address a unique segment within it, which is a
sizable risk. A better response would be more targeted, but such
responses are beyond the scope of our monetary policy tools. 
Finally, monetary policy itself is always formed with incomplete
information and, given the lag effects of policy actions, could
sometimes contribute to imbalances or other circumstances that
aggravate a crisis. Identifying such circumstances is usually only possible
with the benefit of hindsight and with knowledge of the economy that
no one, including policymakers, will have when policy actions are first
taken. My point here is that the better we get at pursuing our long-term
monetary policy objectives, the less likely we are to unknowingly
contribute to crises. And any crises that do arise are likely to be smaller
and less damaging. 
Thus, I believe the best we may be able to do to prevent financial
crises from a monetary policy standpoint is to aim for stable economic
conditions that will make market imbalances less likely to occur or less
severe should they occur. This is not to ignore the important function
of monetary authorities to use open market or discount window
operations to quell liquidity crises and threats to market confidence,
much as occurred after the 1987 stock market crash, the 1998 Russian
debt crisis, and 9/11. 
IV. CLOSING COMMENTS 
I certainly concur with those who stress the need to take a
systemwide or macro-prudential view of financial market supervision.
This has always been important. And it remains important today as we
move toward a more market-driven financial system and witness rapid
growth in capital markets. The larger institutions, more extensive
linkages across institutions and markets, and more complex financial
instruments that inevitably follow these developments will further
contribute to the need to look at supervision and financial risk on a
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I think we have already come far in improving the overall resiliency
of our financial system and limiting the buildup of common and
significant exposures both systemwide and between individual
institutions and markets. In the coming years, we must continue down
this path. Monetary policy must also continue playing a significant role
in ensuring a stable environment in which the expectations of debtors,
creditors, and investors can be realized. Yet, I believe that monetary
policymakers and bank supervisors working independently will not be
enough. To accomplish our objectives, they, along with supervisory
authorities from all other parts of the financial system, will have to work
together to share information about risks developing in the institutions
and markets under their review. More than ever before, we will need
better communication and coordination to ensure the financial stability
needed to fully support sustainable economic growth. 